Don\u27t Put a Corn in\u3ci\u3e Granholm v. Heald:\u3c/i\u3e  New York\u27s Ban on Interstate Direct Shipments of Wine is Unconstitutional by Nance, Andre
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 16 | Issue 2 Article 9
2009
Don't Put a Corn in Granholm v. Heald: New York's
Ban on Interstate Direct Shipments of Wine is
Unconstitutional
Andre Nance
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation






DON’T PUT A CORK IN  
GRANHOLM V. HEALD:  
NEW YORK’S BAN ON INTERSTATE 




A new chapter is unfolding in a liquor saga seventy-five years 
in the making that now concerns New York’s use of a state ban on 
interstate direct shipments of wine to grant in-state retailers 
exclusive access to New York’s lucrative direct shipment market at 
the expense of out-of-state competitors.1 Such state-level economic 
                                                           
 * Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2009; M.A., University of Virginia, 
2005; B.A., McGill University, 2003. I deeply thank all who made this Note 
possible, especially my wife, Nancy.  Special thanks to Prof. Nelson Tebbe, 
Devin Taylor, Susanne Flanders, Nicole Roodhuyzen, and Nick Reiter.  
1 This year marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Repeal of Prohibition 
by the Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution on December 
5, 1933. Not limited to New York, this new chapter has national dimensions 
and is being written both in the courthouse and the legislature, with federal 
district courts in New York, Michigan, and Texas differing on how to address 
similarly discriminatory direct shipping bans, and legislatures in Maine, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Rhode Island, and Alabama considering revisions to their 
direct shipping laws. See Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 
2984127 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2007); Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 
2d 848 (N.D. Tex. 2008); see generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE, 6 (2003), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf [hereinafter FTC 
REPORT]; Reuters, Texas Judge Calls Bans on Wine Retailer Shipping 
  
926 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
protectionism suffered a major defeat in 2005, when out-of-state 
wineries challenged the interstate ban in Granholm v. Heald and 
the Supreme Court concluded that allowing in-state wineries to 
bypass wholesalers and retailers and to ship directly to in-state 
consumers but denying such rights to out-of-state wineries and 
shippers violated the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause of 
the United States Constitution.2 With this decision, the Supreme 
Court gave its imprimatur of approval to a balancing standard that 
                                                           
Unconstitutional, RUETERS, Jan. 15, 2008, available at http://www.reuters. 
com/article/pressRelease/idUS21135+16-Jan-2008+BW20080116?sp=true; 
Posting of Sarah Werner to SHIPCOMPLIANT BLOG, Rhode Island and 
Alabama: Let My Pinot Go!, http://shipcompliantblog.com/blog/ (Mar. 27, 
2008, 11:23 EST). 
2 See 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (“States may not enact laws that burden 
out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive advantage to in-
state businesses. This mandate ‘reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that 
was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the 
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the 
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the 
Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.’”) 
(quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979)). In Granholm, 
Justices Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion, while Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O’Connor, and 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, filed 
dissenting opinions. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 464. 
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, otherwise known as the Commerce Clause, 
grants Congress the exclusive power “to regulate commerce . . . among the 
several states . . .” and is understood not only as an affirmative “grant of power 
to Congress to regulate interstate commerce” but also as an “implied limitation 
on States from regulating matters that interfere with interstate commerce—the 
so-called ‘Dormant’ Commerce Clause.”  Michael A. Lawrence, Toward A 
More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 407 (1998). 
 The effect of Granholm on direct-to-consumer shipping has been profound. 
See Garrett Peck, The Future of the Three-Tier System, 84.4 BEVERAGE MEDIA 
METRO NEW YORK 22, 26–27 (2008) (quoting Wine America president Bill 
Nelson: “Granholm opened markets for direct-to-consumer shipping. ‘We’ve 
moved from 27 to 35 states because of the Supreme Court decision.’”) (quoting 
Free the Grapes! executive director Jeremy Benson: “Wineries have the option 
of shipping into states that represent 81% of U.S. wine consumption, up form 
50% in January 2005.”); see also Free the Grapes! Press Releases, available at 
http://www.freethegrapes.org/news.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2008). 
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weighs and attempts to harmonize the federal Commerce Clause 
interest in free trade among the states against each state’s Twenty-
first Amendment interest in regulating alcohol.3 Although an 
exception to the interstate direct shipping ban now exists for out-
of-state wineries, New York continues to engage in economic 
protectionism at the expense of out-of-state retailers.4 
With the national wine retail market standing at thirty billion 
dollars in 2007 and New Yorkers consuming far more wine than 
any other market except California and Florida, the stakes are high, 
and the State of New York has understandably, if shortsightedly, 
tried to favor resident businesses by banning direct shipments to 
consumers by their out-of-state competitors.5 In September 2007, 
                                                           
3 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Granholm, other courts applied 
this balancing standard. See, e.g., Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 519 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (“With the elimination of the local preference statute, no interest of 
the Twenty-first Amendment is implicated, yet the discrimination violating the 
Commerce Clause is eliminated.”); see also Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Interplay 
Between Twenty-First Amendment and Commerce Clause Concerning State 
Regulation of Intoxicating Liquors, 116 A.L.R. 5th 149 (2004). 
4 This economic protectionism involves an almost textbook case of facial 
discrimination against interstate commerce. In Granholm, the Court noted that 
it had struck down New York laws that “directly regulate[] or discriminate[] 
against interstate commerce, or when [their] effect is to favor in-state economic 
interests over out-of-state interests.” 544 U.S. at 487 (quoting Brown-Forman 
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)); see 
also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (“Shielding in-state industries 
from out-of-state competition is almost never a legitimate local purpose, and 
state laws that amount to ‘simple economic protectionism’ consequently have 
been subject to a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity.’”) (quoting City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see also City of 
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at  624 (“The clearest example of such legislation is a 
law that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State’s borders.”); 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981); H. P. 
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1949); Toomer v. 
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403–06 (1949); Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 
U.S. 511, 525 (1935); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1925); 
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875). 
5 In 2003, New Yorkers consumed 20,336,000 cases of wine behind 
California’s 46,067,000 and Florida’s 20,588,000 but well ahead of Texas’s 
fourth-place 12,791,000.  See ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP, CONSUMPTION OF 
TOTAL WINE RANKED BY STATE, 1993–2003 (TOP 12), available at 
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the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York determined in Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle that New York’s 
interest in using its ban on interstate shipping to favor in-state 
retailers so outweighed the federal interest in free trade that the 
court declined “to undertake a dormant Commerce Clause analysis” 
and simply assessed New York’s use of the ban as “within the 
authority granted to New York by the Twenty-first Amendment.”6 
Using suspect logic, the court held that New York’s use of the 
direct shipping ban to favor in-state retailers was “integral” to New 
York’s three-tier system of regulating the importation and sale of 
wine.7 The reality, however, is more complex, and requires a more 
nuanced and measured approach than that found in Arnold’s Wines. 
Under a basic three-tier liquoring licensing and distribution 
system, a state issues licenses to producers, wholesalers, and 
retailers, who must operate separately.8 In the case of wine, 
wineries licensed as producers make it, wholesalers distribute it, 
                                                           
http://www.andersoneconomicgroup.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=disp
lay_aeg&doc_ID=1825 (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) (citing ADAMS BEVERAGE 
GROUP, 2004 WINE HANDBOOK (2004)); see also The Wine Institute, 2007 
California Wine Sales: Up 2 Percent in U.S. As Wine Continues to Gain 
Popularity Among Americans, available at http://www.wineinstitute.org/ 
resources/statistics/article122 (last visited Apr. 4, 2008) (listing the national 
retail market at 30 billion dollars); MKF RESEARCH, THE IMPACT OF WINE, 
GRAPES AND GRAPE PRODUCTS ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 2007: FAMILY 
BUSINESSES BUILDING VALUE 3 (2007), available at http://www.house. 
gov/radanovich/wine/documents/Economic_Impact_on_National_Economy_200
7.pdf. 
6 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 413–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); contra Siesta Vill. Mkt. 
v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
7 See Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 413–14. 
8 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466 (citing FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5–
7). Federal and state laws limit vertical overlap between tiers of licensees. Id. 
(citing FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5; 27 U.S.C. § 205 (2007); Bainbridge 
v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir. 2002)); see also Arnold’s Wines, 
Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 403 (“The three-tiers refer to: (1) the producer; (2) the 
distributor or wholesaler; and (3) the retailer. Under the three-tier system, a 
producer sells its wine to a licensed in-state wholesaler, who pays excise taxes 
and delivers the wine to a licensed in-state retailer. The retailer, in turn, sells the 
wine to consumers and, where applicable, collects sales taxes.”). 
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and retailers sell it to the public.9 Focusing on the Supreme Court’s 
general approval of this system, the Arnold’s Wines court 
interpreted Granholm as addressing only an exception to the three-
tier systemshipping laws that allow wineries to bypass 
wholesalers and retailers by shipping directly to the publicand 
not other aspects of the three-tier system that discriminate against 
out-of-state businesses.10 
Subsequent decisions in two nearly identical Michigan and 
Texas cases have differed from the outcome in New York, and the 
Texas court even criticized the Arnold’s Wines decision as “a 
misreading of Granholm . . . [that] elevates a state’s rights under 
the Twenty-first Amendment to a level that improperly 
supersedes the dormant Commerce Clause.”11 These courts rightly 
disagreed with the Arnold’s Wines assertion that the Twenty-first 
Amendment completely shields New York’s discriminatory 
shipping laws from Commerce Clause analysis.12 Though a final 
district court decision in Michigan is pending, bans on direct 
shipments from out-of-state retailers are now unconstitutional in 
Texas, and the New York decision, in declining to balance fully the 
federal interest in free trade against New York’s interest in 
                                                           
9 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3(20), (26), (35), 103–05 (Gould 
2007). 
10 See Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 411. In doing so, the 
Arnold’s Wines decision tried to isolate wineries from retailers, two of the three 
tiers of licensees New York, Michigan, and Texas use to regulate alcohol, a 
regulatory scheme “under which alcohol producers must go through wholesalers 
and distributors, who must in turn go through retailers, who can then sell to 
consumers.” Vijay Shanker, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, The Commerce 
Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 85 VA. L. REV. 353, 353 (1999). 
11 Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 867 n.19; see also Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. 
Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 2984127, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 
2007). 
12 The Twenty-first Amendment granted states the power to regulate 
alcohol. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. In particular, Section 2 of the 
amendment states: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, 
or possession of the United States for delivery or use there in of intoxicating 
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXI, § 2. 
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regulating alcohol, is deeply flawed.13 
If the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits uphold these district 
court opinions, the Supreme Court itself will soon have to resolve 
the conflicting interpretations of Granholm. In the Granholm 
decision itself, though, the Court gave an indication of how it will 
approach the matter by declaring that discrimination is “neither 
authorized nor permitted by the Twenty-first Amendment,” 
“contrary to the Commerce Clause[,] and . . . not saved by the 
Twenty-first Amendment.”14 The Court further explained that the 
“Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the 
Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the rule that 
States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own 
producers” and that “[s]tates may not enact laws . . . simply to 
give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.”15 Most of all, 
the Court determined that “[Section 2 of the Twenty-first 
Amendment] does not allow States to regulate the direct shipment 
of wine on terms that discriminate. . . .”16 New York has no 
compelling justification for discriminating against out-of-state 
retailers, and striking down this differential treatment does not 
abrogate New York’s core Twenty-first Amendment rights.  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court will likely strike down New 
York’s use of the ban on interstate direct shipping to favor in-state 
retailers.17 
Part One of this Note argues that, contrary to the analysis of 
the recent New York Arnold’s Wines decision, the federal interest 
in free trade with respect to interstate wine shipping is quite 
strong.18 As a threshold matter, New York discriminates between 
“similarly situated” entitiesin-state and out-of-state retailers 
                                                           
13 See Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 412 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]his Court is not aware of any pre-Granholm authority 
calling into question the legitimacy of state laws that limit licenses to retailers 
and wholesalers located within the state.”). 
14 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466, 489 (2005). 
15 Id. at 486, 472. 
16 Id. at 476. 
17 See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D. 
Tex. 2008). 
18 Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2. at 862–64, 867. 
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that would compete in New York’s wine consumer market, and 
thus the State invites a high level of judicial scrutiny.19 The ban on 
direct to customer shipments into the state creates a legal barrier 
limiting access to New York’s market.20 The burden on interstate 
commerce is “clearly excessive” in relation to the two local benefits 
New York put forward—efficient tax collection and preventing 
minors’ access to alcohol—because these benefits can be achieved 
without discriminating against out-of-state businesses by requiring 
all retailers to file taxes in a timely fashion and all shippers to 
require an adult signature upon delivery.21 
Part Two of this Note argues that the national interest in free 
                                                           
19 See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 307 n.15 (1997) (“[I]f a 
State discriminates against out-of-state interests by drawing geographical 
distinctions between entities that are otherwise similarly situated, such facial 
discrimination will be subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny even if it is 
directed toward a legitimate health and safety goal.”); see, e.g., City of 
Philadelphia. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–28 (1978); Dean Milk Co. v. 
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353–54 (1951). 
20 New York shipping laws expressly prohibit shipments to consumers that 
originate outside the state. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 102(1)(a), 
102(1)(b) (Gould 2007) (prohibiting shipments “into the state”). In contrast, 
shipments originating within the state are authorized. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. 
CONT. LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, 116 (Gould 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007). As a “package store licensee,” a New York wine 
retailer may sell and deliver liquor and wine “to homes and offices not to be 
resold by the purchaser[;] by messenger afoot[;] by trucking and delivery 
companies who hold a trucking permit issued by the Authority[; and] in a 
vehicle owned and operated, or hired and operated by the package store 
licensee.” New York State Liquor Authority Compliance FAQs, available at 
http://abc.state.ny.us/JSP/content/faq.jsp (last visited Apr. 2, 2008) [hereinafter 
NYSLA Compliance FAQs]. 
21 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 491 (2005); see also Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates 
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes 
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course 
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”) (emphasis 
added). 
  
932 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
trade among the states outweighs New York’s interest in using its 
ban on interstate direct shipping to grant in-state retailers exclusive 
access to New York’s direct shipping consumer market. Though 
Granholm, on the facts, pertains to direct shipping by wineries and 
the differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state producers,22 
the plain language of Granholm stresses the need to protect out-of-
state “economic interests” broadly from economic protectionism, 
not producers exclusively.23 Banning shipments by out-of-state 
retailers is not critical to maintaining the centralized control of New 
York’s “unquestionably legitimate” three-tier system.24 Though 
wine shipped directly to New York consumers by out-of-state 
retailers would bypass in-state wholesalers,25 New York can 
maintain centralized control over out-of-state retailers and enforce 
compliance with its regulations “by requiring a permit as a 
condition of direct shipping.”26 Without an exception for out-of-
state retailers, however, New York’s use of the ban on direct 
shipping clearly burdens interstate commerce in a way unnecessary 
to maintaining New York’s central control in regulating alcohol.27 
Part Three of this Note further argues that extending the current 
permit exception to New York’s ban on interstate direct shipments 
does not abrogate New York’s right to regulate alcohol. Though the 
Twenty-first Amendment is understood to grant New York 
“virtually complete control” over in-state liquor distribution,28 
                                                           
22 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472. 
23 Id. (“This Court has long held that, in all but the narrowest 
circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate 
‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits 
the former and burdens the latter.’”) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). 
24 See id. at 488–89 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 
423, 432 (1990)); see also North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 447 (Scalia J., 
concurring). 
25 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 1–164 (2007). 
26 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491; see also Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. 
Supp. 2d 848, 867 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
27 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488–89 (2005) (quoting North 
Dakota, 493 U.S. at 432). 
28 Cal. Retail Liquor Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 100 
(1980); see also North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432 (holding that the three-tier 
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“there is a marked difference between ‘virtually complete control’ 
and absolute control.”29 Further, extending the permit exception to 
the ban has no effect on New York’s ability to regulate alcohol 
using the three-tier system.30 Unless New York establishes that 
these core interests are impaired in a concrete way, it cannot be 
said as a matter of law that New York’s Twenty-first Amendment 
interest in using the ban to favor in-state businesses outweighs the 
federal Commerce Clause interest in promoting free trade.31 
For these reasons, this Note argues that the decision in 
Arnold’s Wines should be overturned.32 As it stands, New York’s 
use of the ban on interstate direct shipping denies out-of-state 
retailers access to New York’s lucrative wine consumer market, 
facially discriminating against out-of-state economic interests while 
providing in-state retailers with exclusive access.33 This Note 
argues that New York can and must give out-of-state retailers 
                                                           
system is “unquestionably legitimate”). 
29 Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 2984127, at *4 
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2007) (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Ass’n, 445 U.S. at 
100). 
30 In Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, New York did not make a concrete 
showing of any harm to the three-tier system, instead asserting only that 
“requiring alcohol to pass through the three-tier system allows the State to 
collect taxes more efficiently and to decrease the sale of alcohol to minors” and 
that “[d]irect shipment laws . . . are integral to maintaining centralized control 
over alcohol sales because they ensure that every drop of alcohol flows through 
the three-tier system.” 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Without 
concrete evidence to support these assertions, New York failed the standard set 
by the Supreme Court: “Our Commerce Clause cases demand more than mere 
speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods.” Granholm, 
544 U.S. at 492. “The Court has upheld state regulations that discriminate 
against interstate commerce only after finding, based on concrete record evidence, 
that a State's nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove unworkable.” Id. at 493. 
31 Id. 
32 See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D. 
Tex. 2008); see also Siesta Vill. Mkt., 2007 WL 2984127, at *4–5. 
33 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (“Shielding in-state 
industries from out-of-state competition is almost never a legitimate local 
purpose, and state laws that amount to ‘simple economic protectionism’ 
consequently have been subject to a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity.’”) 
(quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). 
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“access [to its market] . . . on equal terms.”34 
I.  NEW YORK’S BAN ON DIRECT SHIPPING VIOLATES THE 
FEDERAL COMMERCE CLAUSE INTEREST IN FREE TRADE 
When states attempt to regulate interstate commerce, they 
encroach on Congress’s exclusive power under the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution “[t]o regulate Commerce. 
. . among the several States.”35 According to James Madison, a 
“dormant” or “negative” aspect of the Clause 
grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States 
in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative 
and preventive provision against injustice among the States 
themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the 
positive purposes of the General Government, in which 
alone, however, the remedial power could be lodged, 
and this dormant aspect is understood to limit state’s power to 
enact laws that interfere with or burden interstate commerce.36 
New York’s shipping laws implicate this constitutional 
“prohibition against border-closing laws” by giving unequal 
treatment to in-state and out-of-state wine retailers.37 By assigning 
to in-state retailers the right to ship directly to New York 
consumers while generally denying this right to out-of-state 
retailers, New York engages in the kind of blatant economic 
protectionism that clearly benefits in-state businesses at the 
expense of out-of-state competitors.38 
                                                           
34 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005). 
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see generally, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36–38 (1937). 
36 Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (1911) (Max Farrand, 
ed., 1st Am. ed. 1911) (quoted in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 
U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994)). 
37 See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 
2000); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997); Dean 
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 
275, 280 (1875); Cooley v. Bd. of Port Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851). 
38 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148; see also City of Philadelphia v. New 
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A. In-State and Out-of-State Wine Retailers are “Similarly 
Situated” for Dormant Commerce Clause Purposes 
A threshold question in determining whether a state law 
violates the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause is whether the 
in-state and out-of-state entities in question are “similarly 
situated.”39 There can be no violation of this dormant aspect unless 
in-state and out-of-state wine retailers are “similarly situated.”40 
The Supreme Court has found that entities are similarly situated 
when there exists “actual or prospective competition between the 
supposedly favored and disfavored entities in a single market.”41 
Further, the Supreme Court explained: 
[If] the different entities serve different markets, and would 
continue to do so even if the supposedly discriminatory 
burden were removed. . . [,] eliminating the . . . regulatory 
differential would not serve the dormant Commerce 
Clause’s fundamental objective of preserving a national 
market for competition undisturbed by preferential 
advantages conferred by a State upon its residents or 
resident competitors.42 
Where, as here, in-state and out-of-state wine retailers engage in the 
same business—selling wine to retail consumers—and seek access 
to the exact same market—New York’s lucrative wine consumer 
base—the retailers are potential competitors that are “similarly 
situated” for purposes of the dormant aspect of the Commerce 
Clause.43 
                                                           
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
39 Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997). 
40 Id. at 298–99. 
41 Id. at 300. 
42 Id. at 299. 
43 The Texas district court approached this threshold issue in the same way 
and reached the same conclusion. See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 
2d 848, 873–74 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
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B. New York Discriminates Against Interstate Commerce by 
Allowing In-State Retailers to Ship Directly to New York 
Consumers and Banning Shipments by Out-of-State 
Retailers 
Through a combination of shipping provisions promulgated 
under its Alcohol Beverage Control Law (“ABC Law”), New York 
discriminates against out-of-state wine retailers.44 First, New York 
authorizes wine retailers residing in New York to sell and ship wine 
directly to consumers within New York.45 Second, New York 
generally prohibits wine shipments “into the state,” unless the in-
state recipient is a licensed wholesaler or the out-of-state shipper 
has previously received a permit available only to licensed out-of-
state wineries.46 Together, these shipping provisions mandate 
“differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic 
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”47 This 
combination of shipping provisions facially discriminates against 
out-of-state business interests, including wine retailers, by singling 
out shipments “into the state” while ignoring shipments originating 
within New York, thereby effectively giving in-state retailers 
exclusive access to New York’s consumers while denying out-of-
state wine retailers access to the same market.48 
Specifically, ABC Law provisions 94, 105.8, 105.9, and 116, 
and Rule 10 of the Rules of the State Liquor Authority authorize 
                                                           
44 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 1–164 (Gould 2007). 
45 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, 116 (Gould 
2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007). 
46 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 79(c), 102(1)(a), 102(1)(b) (Gould 
2007); N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory: Direct Shipment of Wine to New 
York Customers by Wine Manufacturers Located outside New York (Aug. 5, 
2005), http://www.abc.state.ny.us/system/files/advisory-out-of-state-winery.pdf. 
47 Id.; see also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988) 
(“[S]tate statutes that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are 
routinely struck down.”). 
48 See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 
99 (1994); see also Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 39 (1980) 
(holding that a statute burdens interstate commerce if “it overtly prevents foreign 
enterprises from competing in local markets”). 
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in-state retailers to sell and ship wine directly to consumers.49 As a 
“package store licensee,” a New York retailer may deliver the wine 
that they sell: “to homes and offices not to be resold by the 
purchaser[;] by messenger afoot[;] by trucking and delivery 
companies who hold a trucking permit issued by the Authority[; 
and] in a vehicle owned and operated, or hired and operated by the 
package store licensee.”50 To become such a licensee, a candidate 
residing in New York applies to the agency that oversees 
enforcement of the state’s ABC Laws, the New York State Liquor 
Authority (“NYSLA”).51 If the NYSLA approves the application, 
the newly licensed New York retailer can deliver directly to a New 
York consumer’s residence immediately.52 
Meanwhile, ABC Law provisions 100(1), 102(1)(a), and 
102(1)(b) ban all direct shipments “into the state” and generally 
require all wine shipped into the state to pass first through a New 
York business entity, a wholesaler, licensed by the State of New 
York.53 Because of this general prohibition against direct shipments 
into the state, even if out-of-state retailers were eligible for retail 
licenses within the state, those out-of-state retailers who had 
received licenses would still be prohibited from shipping directly 
“into the state” to New York consumers.54 
                                                           
49 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, and 116 (Gould 
2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007). 
50 NYSLA Compliance FAQs, supra note 20. 
51 See Welcome to New York State Liquor Authority, http://abc.state. 
ny.us/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008). 
52 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, 116 (Gould 
2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007); see also NYSLA 
Compliance FAQs, supra note 20. 
53 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 100(1) (Gould 2007) (“No person shall 
manufacture for sale or sell at wholesale or retail any alcoholic beverage within 
the state without obtaining the appropriate license therefor required by this 
chapter.”); § 102(1)(a) (“[N]o alcoholic beverages shall be shipped into the state 
unless the same shall be consigned to a person duly licensed hereunder to traffic 
in alcoholic beverages.”); § 102(1)(b) (“[N]o common carrier or other person 
shall bring or carry into the state any alcoholic beverages, unless the same shall 
be consigned to a person duly licensed hereunder to traffic in alcoholic 
beverages. . . .”). 
54 See NYSLA Compliance FAQs, supra note 20; see also N.Y. ALCO. 
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In an exception to this general ban on interstate shipping, 
however, in the aftermath of Granholm, out-of-state wineries have 
won the right to apply for an “Out of State Direct Shipper’s 
License” that permits them to ship directly to New York 
consumers.55 This direct shipping permit operates as an exception 
to New York’s ban on direct shipments into the state. The permit, 
however, is only available to persons who are recognized as wine 
producers by the federal government and another state.56 As such, 
out-of-state wine retailers, who do not produce wine themselves, 
are ineligible for this permit.57 Under the status quo, then, out-of-
state retailers are deprived both of the opportunity to sell wine 
directly to customers within New York and the right to deliver 
wine to customers within New York.58 Meanwhile, their retail 
counterparts and would-be competitors in New York receive these 
advantages by virtue of being located within the state.59 This 
combination of laws confers markedly different rights to in-state 
and out-of-state retailers with respect to their ability to sell and 
deliver wine directly to New York consumers. 
New York’s discrimination against out-of-state wine retailers 
strikingly mirrors its discrimination against out-of-state wineries 
that was struck down by the Supreme Court in Granholm.60 In 
that case, when faced with New York’s statutory scheme of 
allowing its own wineries to bypass in-state wholesalers and 
retailers and to sell directly to consumers while denying such a 
                                                           
BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, 116 (Gould 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007). 
55 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79(c) (Gould 2007). There are also 
quantity limits. See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory: Direct Shipment of 
Wine to New York Customers by Wine Manufacturers Located outside New 
York (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.abc.state.ny.us/system/files/advisory-out-of-
state-winery.pdf. 
56 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79(c) (Gould 2007). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See NYSLA Compliance FAQs, supra note 20; see also N.Y. ALCO. 
BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 94, 105.8, 105.9, 116 (Gould 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 67 (2007). 
60 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005). 
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clear economic advantage to out-of-state wineries, the Supreme 
Court had “no difficulty concluding that New York . . . [had] 
discriminate[d] against interstate commerce through its direct-
shipping laws”61 and struck down New York’s discriminatory 
scheme.62 The Granholm majority found that “[a]llowing States to 
discriminate against out-of-state [wine producers] ‘invite[s] a 
multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the very 
purpose of the Commerce Clause.’”63 Similarly, New York’s facial 
discrimination against out-of-state wine retailers creates a de facto 
preferential trade area and gives New York wine retailers exclusive 
access to New York consumers.64 By burdening interstate 
commerce to favor in-state businesses, New York’s direct shipping 
laws inhibit free trade among the states and violate the dormant 
aspect of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 
                                                           
61 Id. at 476. The Granholm majority’s succinct criticism of both schemes 
is well illustrated by its comments regarding Michigan’s discriminatory 
scheme: 
Michigan allows in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers, 
subject only to a licensing requirement. Out-of-state wineries, whether 
licensed or not, face a complete ban on direct shipment. The differential 
treatment requires all out-of-state wine, but not all in-state wine, to 
pass through an in-state wholesaler and retailer before reaching 
consumers. These two extra layers of overhead increase the cost of out-
of-state wines to Michigan consumers. The cost differential, and in 
some cases the inability to secure a wholesaler for small shipments, can 
effectively bar small wineries from the Michigan market. 
Id. at 473–74. 
62 See id. 
63 Id. at 473 (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 
(1951)); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521–23 
(1935). 
64 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473. 
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C. New York’s Putative Interests—Preventing Minors’ Access 
to Alcohol and Efficient Tax Collection—Can Be Achieved 
Through Nondiscriminatory Alternatives 
New York is unable to justify its discrimination against 
interstate commerce because it is unable to put forward legitimate 
local purposes that “cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”65 When New York’s legislature 
enacted its three-tier liquor licensing system seventy-five years 
ago, its primary goals were to prevent minors’ access to alcohol 
and to assist state tax collection.66 The legislature also aimed “to 
promote temperance by keeping the price of alcohol artificially 
high.”67 To justify its discrimination against out-of-state retailers, 
                                                           
65 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); see also 
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (“Facial discrimination by 
itself may be a fatal defect” and “at a minimum . . . invokes strictest scrutiny.”); 
see also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (“[O]nce a state law is 
shown to discriminate against interstate commerce either on its face or in 
practical effects, [the Supreme Court has held] the burden falls on the State to 
demonstrate both that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose, and that this 
purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
66 Alix M. Freedman & John R. Emshwiller, Vintage System: Big Liquor 
Wholesaler Finds Change Stalking Its Very Private World, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
4, 1999, at A1. By requiring producers to sell their alcoholic beverages through 
wholesalers, New York’s legislature “hoped to collect taxes more efficiently and 
to limit alcohol sales to minors.” FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 6; see also 
N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (Gould 2007); N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 420–45, 
1105(a), (d) (Gould 2007) (excise and sales taxes); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 20, §§ 60.1 et seq. (2007) (taxes on alcoholic beverages); Arnold’s 
Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
67 Having the producers sell to distributors who then sold the alcoholic 
beverages to retailers raised the price of alcohol by creating an extra link in the 
chain of distribution. By raising the price of alcohol, one might argue, one 
lowers the rate of consumption. It is hard to gauge the extent to which this goal 
still guides lawmakers, but to the extent that it does, it would explain why 
some lawmakers are less receptive to the argument that direct shipping is a good 
thing because it increases competition and lowers prices for alcohol consumers. 
See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. 
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the State of New York again put forward two of these interests: 
preventing the access of minors to alcohol and efficiently collecting 
taxes.68 These two interests, however, failed to justify similar 
discrimination in Granholm, where the majority concluded that 
“the State . . . provide[d] little concrete evidence for the sweeping 
assertion that they cannot police direct shipments by out-of-state 
wineries,” and for the same reasons, these two interests again do 
not justify discriminating against out-of-state retailers.69 
First, preventing minors’ access to alcohol can be achieved by 
the nondiscriminatory alternative of requiring an adult signature 
upon delivery.70 As the NYSLA itself has announced, “shipping 
companies like FedEx are required . . . to receive approval from the 
[NYSLA] before transporting wine directly to New York residents, 
ensuring that common carriers have the proper systems in place 
enabling them to accurately capture and verify a recipient’s age.”71 
These safeguards achieve the state’s interest in preventing minors’ 
access to alcohol without discriminating against out-of-state 
retailers. Further, of the twenty-six States that allow direct 
shipping, none report problems with underage drinking and 
officials openly recognize a number of reasons why underage 
drinkers find online wine purchases unappealing, not least of which 
is that underage drinkers seek immediate gratification, not several 
days of waiting for a shipment to arrive.72 Because preventing 
                                                           
68 See Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F.Supp. 2d at 407. 
69 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 492 (2005). 
70 Id. at 489–91. 
71 Press Release, State of New York Executive Dep’t Div. of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control, State Liquor Authority Announces Approval of FedEx to 
Make Direct Wine Shipments to New Yorkers: Approval Offers N.Y. Residents 
Greater Choice and Convenience (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.abc.state.ny. 
us/system/files/mediaadvisory020906.pdf. 
72 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490 (“A recent study by . . . the FTC found 
that the 26 States currently allowing direct shipments report no problems with 
minors’ increased access to wine. This is not surprising for several reasons. 
First, minors are less likely to consume wine, as opposed to beer, wine coolers, 
and hard liquor. Second, minors who decide to disobey the law have more direct 
means of doing so. Third, direct shipping is an imperfect avenue of obtaining 
alcohol for minors who, in the words of the past president of the National 
Conference of State Liquor Administrators, ‘want instant gratification.’ 
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minors’ access to alcohol can be achieved without discriminating 
against out-of-state retailers, this state interest does not support 
discriminating against out-of-state retailers.73 
Second, with respect to efficient tax collection, as the Supreme 
Court explained in Granholm: “[I]mprovements in technology have 
eased the burden of monitoring out-of-state wineries. Background 
checks can be done electronically. Financial records and sales data 
can be mailed, faxed, or submitted via e-mail.”74 New York is 
equally capable of running background checks on out-of-state 
retailers, especially in light of out-of-state retailers’ ability to 
provide New York with their financial records and sales data. 
Further, the risk of tax evasion presented by online sales does not 
change with or without the prohibition on direct sales by out-of-
state wine retailers.75 Further still, since Granholm, New York has 
collected “taxes directly from out-of-state wineries whose products 
are sold in the state.”76 In projecting whether New York will be 
able to collect taxes efficiently from out-of-state retailers, it is 
particularly instructive that New York has not reported problems 
collecting taxes from out-of-state wineries.77 In sum, because 
modern technology allows taxes to be collected efficiently without 
discriminating against out-of-state retailers, this interest does not 
justify New York’s discrimination against out-of-state retailers.78 
                                                           
(explaining why minors rarely buy alcohol via the mail or the Internet).”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 As a Michigan district court astutely observed, “there is a risk for tax 
evasion with direct shipping, whether in-state or out-of-state.” See Siesta Vill. 
Mkt. v. Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 2984127, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 
12, 2007) (citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490–91). 
76 Id. 
77 See N.Y. STATE LIQUOR AUTH., DIV. OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE 
CONTROL, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT; N.Y. STATE LIQUOR AUTH., DIV. OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT; see also Press 
Release, State of New York Executive Dep’t Div. of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control, State Liquor Authority Announces Approval Of Fedex To Make Direct 
Wine Shipments To New Yorkers (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.abc.state.ny.us/ 
system/files/mediaadvisory020906.pdf. 
78 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491; see also Siesta Vill. Mkt., 2007 WL 
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Despite the Supreme Court’s clear guidance on these issues, the 
Arnold’s Wines decision nevertheless cited these two state interests 
without any analysis of whether the interests could be achieved in 
a manner that avoided discrimination against out-of-state retailers.79 
In making the case for judgment in favor of its discrimination, New 
York should have been required to provide “more than mere 
speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods” 
and should have been required to meet the higher burden of 
showing that “the discrimination is demonstrably justified.”80 
However, unlike in Granholm, where the Supreme Court refused to 
allow New York to make sweeping assertions about its inability to 
police direct shipments by out-of-state wine producers without 
concrete evidence,81 the Arnold’s Wines opinion appears to have 
accepted New York’s justifications without further scrutiny.82 
New York should have had to make at least a concrete showing that 
it could neither collect taxes effectively nor prevent minors’ access 
to alcohol without the discriminatory direct shipping laws.83 The 
State likely would have been unable to produce such evidence and 
meet such a burden.84 At bottom, neither interest put forward 
excuses New York’s discrimination against out-of-state retailers 
because both efficient tax collection and preventing minors’ access 
to alcohol can be achieved without such discrimination. 
                                                           
2984127, at *5. 
79 See Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
80 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492 (quoting Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 (1992)). 
81 See id. at 490. 
82 See Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
83 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492 (quoting Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 504 
U.S. at 344). 
84 See id. at 490; see also Siesta Vill. Mkt., 2007 WL 2984127, at *4–5. 
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II.  THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN FREE TRADE OUTWEIGHS NEW 
YORK’S INTEREST IN AN ABSOLUTE BAN ON INTERSTATE DIRECT 
SHIPPING 
The federal interest in free trade outweighs New York’s interest 
in using its ban on interstate direct shipping to favor in-state 
retailers with exclusive access to the New York direct shipping 
consumer market. As the Arnold’s Wines decision correctly 
observed, on the facts, the Supreme Court’s Granholm decision 
pertains directly to differential treatment of in-state and out-of-
state producers.85 The Arnold’s Wines decision, however, errs in 
arguing that the principles in Granholm only apply to an exception 
to the three-tier licensing system, direct shipping by wine 
producers to wine consumers that bypasses wholesalers and 
retailers, and not to the three-tier licensing system itself.86 More to 
the point, however, a challenge to New York’s use of its ban on 
interstate shipping to favor in-state retailers at the expense of out-
of-state retailers in no way amounts to an attack on the entire 
three-tier system, and striking down New York’s use of the ban to 
unfairly privilege its own retailers would neither invalidate nor 
undermine the three-tier system, even if out-of-state retailers 
bypass in-state wholesalers.87 First of all, it is a logical fallacy to 
argue that “allowing out-of-state retailers to compete in a state’s 
domestic market ‘is clearly an attack on the three-tier system 
itself.’”88 On a practical level, though, New York could maintain 
centralized control and enforce compliance with its regulations by 
                                                           
85 Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 412. 
86 Id. at 411. 
87 See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D. 
Tex. 2008) (“[A] state can treat in-state and out-of-state entities on equal terms 
and still preserve its three-tier system.”); see also N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. 
LAW §§1–164 (Gould 2007); see also Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 
403. 
88 See Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 867 n.19 (“[I]t does not follow that 
allowing out-of-state retailers to compete in a state’s domestic market ‘is clearly 
an attack on the three-tier system itself.’”) (quoting Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 
F. Supp. 2d at 411). 
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using a direct shipping permit system similar to the one it currently 
administers to out-of-state wineries.89 In balancing and attempting 
to harmonize the Twenty-first Amendment with the federal 
Commerce Clause, on the particular issue of New York’s use of its 
ban on interstate shipping to favor its in-state retailers, the federal 
Commerce Clause interest in promoting free trade surely outweighs 
New York’s Twenty-first Amendment in regulating alcohol. 
A. The Supreme Court Struck Down Shipping Laws That 
Discriminated Against Out-of-State “Economic 
Interests” 
The most ready explanation for why, on the facts, the Supreme 
Court’s Granholm decision applies to out-of-state producers is 
because it was out-of-state producers who were challenging New 
York’s ban on direct shipping.90 The Granholm majority, however, 
broadened the prospective effect of the decision by focusing “more 
on discrimination against out-of-state economic interest and access 
to out-of-state markets, rather than, specifically, on out-of-state 
wine producers.”91 The plain language of the Granholm majority 
opinion stresses the need to broadly protect out-of-state 
“economic interests” from economic protectionism as opposed to 
protect out-of-state wine producers exclusively.92 Out-of-state 
wine retailers who want to compete with in-state retailers in the 
New York market possess such an “economic interest.”93 
The Granholm majority articulated an underlying principle of 
“mutual economic interests” behind the enforcement of the 
                                                           
89 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 491 (2005); see also Perry, 530 
F. Supp. 2d at 867. 
90 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
91 Siesta Vill. Mkt., 2006 WL 2984127, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2007) 
(citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472–73) (emphasis added). 
92 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (“Time and again this Court has held that, 
in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause 
if they mandate ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic 
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’”) (quoting Or. Waste 
Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). 
93 Id. at 474–75. 
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Commerce Clause94 in which “[r]ivalries among the States are . . . 
kept to a minimum, and a proliferation of trade zones is 
prevented.”95 The Granholm majority used these broad principles 
to scrutinize laws that allowed in-state, but not out-of-state, 
wineries to ship directly to customers. The majority wrote: 
Laws of the type at issue in the instant cases contradict 
these principles. They deprive citizens of their right to have 
access to the markets of other States on equal terms. The 
perceived necessity for reciprocal sale privileges risks 
generating the trade rivalries and animosities, the alliances 
and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in particular, the 
Commerce Clause were designed to avoid.96 
In short, the laws were offensive and violated the Commerce 
Clause not because they discriminated against out-of-state 
producers and their products in particular, but because the laws 
offended an underlying principle of “mutual economic interests” by 
“depriv[ing] citizens of their right to have access to the markets of 
other States on equal terms.”97 In transposing the principles of 
Granholm to the ongoing discrimination against out-of-state 
retailers, then, it is more reasonable to focus on the majority 
opinion’s broad language with respect to protecting out-of-state 
“economic interests” than to narrowly limit, as in the improvident 
Arnold’s Wine decision, the rights recognized in Granholm to only 
out-of-state “wine producers.”98 
                                                           
94 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (“The rule prohibiting state 
discrimination against interstate commerce follows also from the principle that 
States should not be compelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or 
disfavored status for their own citizens. States do not need, and may not 
attempt, to negotiate with other States regarding their mutual economic 
interests.”) (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3) (emphasis added). 
95 Id. (citing C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 
(1994) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 143–45 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of 
the United States, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 362–63 (G. Hunt ed., 
1901). 
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“State policies are protected under the Twenty-first 
Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state the same 
as its domestic equivalent.”99 This language of Granholm does not 
mean that the Twenty-first Amendment shields New York’s use of 
shipping laws to reserve “the exclusive right to sell, deliver, and 
transport wine directly to New York consumers” to in-state 
retailers simply because their out-of-state retail competitors are not 
producers.100 The same general principles enunciated in Granholm 
still generally apply. It thus sounds willfully obtuse to declare, as 
in Arnold’s Wines, that “In upholding the three-tier system, the 
Supreme Court acted intentionally to limit application of the 
nondiscrimination principle enunciated in Granholm to products 
and producers as opposed to wholesalers and retailers. . . .”101 In 
Siesta Village Market v. Perry, the Texas district court  
“respectfully disagree[d]” with this interpretation, and observed 
that “[t]he laws in question in Arnold’s Wines do not appear to 
satisfy that requirement [of treating out of state and domestic 
liquor the same].”102 
In Siesta Village Market, Texas residents and out-of-state 
retailers challenged the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code’s 
provisions restricting the right to ship directly to Texas customers 
to retailer residing in the same county.103 The court determined that 
“[t]he Code facially discriminates . . . [by] giving in-state wine 
retailers access to the direct-shipping markets of their respective 
counties, while denying the same access to out-of-state wine 
retailers.”104 Similarly, in Michigan, where the same out-of-state 
retailer, Siesta Village Market, is currently challenging shipping 
provisions nearly identical to New York’s provisions, the court 
                                                           
99 Id. at 489. 
100 Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D. Tex. 
2008) (quoting Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 402 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
101 515 F. Supp. at 412. 
102 530 F. Supp. 2d at 867 n.19. 
103 See 530 F. Supp. 2d 848; TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 6.03, 
11.46(a)(11), 11.61(b)(19), 22.03, 24.01(c), 24.03, 54.12, 107.05(a), 107.07(a), 
107.07(f), 109.53 (Vernon 2007). 
104 Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 864. 
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denied the State of Michigan’s motion to dismiss and disagreed 
with the State’s explanation for the discrimination against out-of-
state retailers.105 Michigan argued that under its bans on interstate 
direct shipping, “liquor produced out-of-state” was treated “the 
same as its domestic equivalent”106 and that “whether produced in 
Michigan or elsewhere, . . . wine cannot be directly shipped to 
Michigan consumers from out-of-state retailers, and [that] in that 
sense the products are treated equally.”107 Michigan essentially 
asserted that because its shipping laws discriminated between 
retailers based on a wine product’s current location rather than its 
origin, the federal interest in promoting free trade was not 
implicated.108 Refusing to “limit the holding of Granholm in a way 
that is debatable,”109 the court recognized that the general language 
in Granholm made it difficult to limit its effect to producers.110 
In light of the plain reading of Granholm found in the Siesta 
Market analyses, there is little support for the Arnold’s Wines 
holding that the principles found in the Granholm decision 
narrowly apply to an exception to the three-tier licensing system—
direct shipping by wine producers to in-state wine consumers—
and do not apply to other discriminatory aspects of the three-tier 
licensing system.111 The Supreme Court in Granholm, far from 
distinguishing shipping laws pertaining to wine producers from 
those pertaining to retailers, directly compared the shipping rights 
of wine producers and retailers, observing: “Michigan, for example, 
already allows its licensed retailers (over 7,000 of them) to deliver 
alcohol directly to consumers.”112 The thrust and breadth of the 
                                                           
105 See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 2984127, 





110 Id. (“[I]n light of a broad reading of Granholm, [the argument that a 
State is treating out-of-state products equally] may not pass constitutional 
muster under the Commerce Clause.”). 
111 See Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 411 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
112 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 490 (2005). 
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Granholm decision gives ample reason to conclude that the 
principles and holding of the case protect out-of-state retailers as 
well as producers from economic protectionism.113 
B. Treating Out-of-State Competitors the Same as In-State 
Wine Retailers Would Not Invalidate New York’s 
“Unquestionably Legitimate” Licensing System 
It is illogical to argue that striking down New York’s use of its 
ban on direct shipping to favor in-state retailers with exclusive 
access to New York’s direct shipping wine consumer market “is 
clearly an attack on the three-tier system itself.”114 To the 
contrary, treating out-of-state competitors the same as in-state 
retailers neither invalidates nor undermines New York’s long-
standing three-tier system.115 As observed in the Texas Siesta 
Village Market decision, “a state can treat in-state and out-of-state 
entities on equal terms and still preserve its three-tier system.”116 
Similarly, when it struck down New York’s use of its ban on 
interstate direct shipping to favor in-state wineries, the Granholm 
majority declared that striking down the provisions did not “call 
into question [the constitutionality of New York’s] three-tier 
system.”117 As in Granholm and Siesta Village Market, it does not 
follow that striking down New York’s protectionist use of its ban 
on interstate direct shipping “is clearly an attack on the three-tier 
                                                           
113 See generally id.; see also Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455–
56 (1940) (“The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or 
ingenious. In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under 
attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work 
discrimination against interstate commerce.”). 
114 Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 867 n.19 (N.D. Tex. 
2008). (“[A] state can treat in-state and out-of-state entities on equal terms and 
still preserve its three-tier system. Therefore, it does not follow that allowing 
out-of-state retailers to compete in a state’s domestic market ‘is clearly an attack 
on the three-tier system itself.’”) (quoting Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 
2d at 411). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488. 
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system itself.”118 
Simplifying a complex matter, the Fourth Circuit opined in 
Brooks v. Vassar that any “argument that compares the status of 
an in-state retailer with an out-of-state retailer—or that compares 
the status of any other in-state entity under the three-tier system 
with its out-of-state counterpart—is nothing different than an 
argument challenging the three-tier system.”119 Under the Brooks 
analysis, then, the Supreme Court’s act in upholding the challenge 
to New York’s differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
wineries, that is, an “in-state entity” with its “out-of-state 
counterparty,” was ultimately a “challenge to the three-tier 
system” acceptable to the Supreme Court.120 As the Arnold’s Wine 
decision correctly observed, “all nine Justices [in Granholm] agreed 
that [New York’s three-tier system] is within the scope of 
Commerce Clause immunity granted [to] the States by Section 2 of 
the Twenty-first Amendment and that ‘state policies are protected 
under the Twenty-first Amendment when they treat liquor 
produced out-of-state the same as its domestic equivalent.’”121 
What is crucial in this language, however, is that under Granholm, 
provisions of such laws are only protected under the Twenty-first 
Amendment to the extent that they treat “liquor produced out-of-
state the same as its domestic equivalent.”122 The Twenty-first 
Amendment neither shields state laws that violate other provisions 
of the Constitution123 nor abrogates Congress’s federal Commerce 
Clause powers with regard to liquor,124 not least of which is that 
                                                           
118 Id. 
119 Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F. 3d 341, 352 (4th Cir. 2006). 
120 Id. 
121 Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2007); see also 
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Granholm, 544 U.S. at 
517–18 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
122 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
123 See, e.g., Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
124 See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 712–13 
(1984) (“[To conclude] that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated 
to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is 
concerned would . . . be an absurd over-simplification. . . . Notwithstanding the 
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“state regulation of alcohol is limited by the Commerce Clause’s 
nondiscrimination principle.”125 
Despite guidance from the Supreme Court on the enduring 
applicability of this principle to state regulation of alcoholic 
beverages in general, the Arnold’s Wines court incorrectly 
determined that “the nondiscrimination principle enunciated in 
Granholm [is limited] to products and producers as opposed to 
wholesalers and retailers. . . .”126 The Granholm court, however, 
did not specify that the Commerce Clause governs state regulation 
of products but instead used more encompassing language, such as 
referring to “state regulation of alcohol” in general.127 Though it 
may sound fair to argue that “[t]he limited exception afforded 
under the Code for direct sales by wineries does not permit the 
conclusion that [a State] has relinquished its right to regulate the 
vast remainder of wine sales through its three-tier system,” this 
argument misplaces a basic proposition in Granholm: the right to 
regulate wine sales through the three-tier system is not a right to 
discriminate against interstate commerce with impunity, or even to 
dictate that all wine must flow through the three-tier system.128 On 
this latter point, a majority of the Supreme Court in North Dakota 
v. United States determined that the Twenty-first Amendment did 
not authorize North Dakota to require all liquor sold for use in the 
State to be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler; in other 
words, the military could bypass North Dakota’s three-tier 
system.129 
                                                           
Amendment’s broad grant of power to the States, therefore, the Federal 
Government plainly retains authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
even interstate commerce in liquor.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
125 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487 (2005) (citing Bacchus Imports, 
Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984)). 
126 Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007); see also id. at 487; Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 276. 
127 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487 (citing, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 
U.S. at 276). 
128 Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 870 (N.D. Tex. 2008) 
(citing Brooks v. Vasser, 462 F.3d 341, 345, 349, 350 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006); 
Brooks, 462 F.3d at 352 n.3 (Neimeyer, J., concurring); Granholm, 544 U.S. at 
487. 
129 See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990). 
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C.  Though New York’s Long-Standing Three-tier System Has 
Historical Pedigree, It Can and Must Be Modified When 
It Harms the Federal Interest in Free Trade 
Like other states that have adopted a ‘three-tier’ licensing 
system, New York regulates the importation and sale of wine by 
requiring separate licenses for producers, wholesalers, and 
retailers.130 Of these three “tiers” of licensees, producers are 
licensed to make wine; wholesalers to distribute it within the state; 
and retailers to sell it to New York consumers.131 This three-tier 
system remains a testament to the man perhaps most responsible 
for its basic form, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a self-described 
teetotaler and supporter of Prohibition who near its end in 1933 
commissioned a study on how New York could best regulate the 
alcohol industry.132 
From 1920 to 1933, the Eighteenth Amendment had banned the 
sale, manufacture, and transportation of alcoholic beverages within 
the United States.133 By 1933, however, the lack of legal regulation 
had resulted in a nationwide illegal industry that produced and 
distributed alcoholic beverages, keeping the American public well 
supplied.134 New York’s licensing system thus began as a direct 
response to the failure of Prohibition.135 
In early 1933, as it became clear that the proposed Twenty-
first Amendment would probably be ratified, then Governor 
                                                           
130 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 5–7. Federal and state laws limit vertical overlap between tiers of licensees. 
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466; 27 U.S.C. § 205 (2007); see, e.g., Bainbridge 
v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir. 2002). 
131 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3(20), (26), (35), 103–05 (Gould 
2007). 
132 See Harry Gene Levine, The Birth of American Alcohol Control, 12 
CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 63, 84 (1985). 
133 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (“[T]he manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the 
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.”), repealed by 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
134 See Levine, supra note 132, at 83. 
135 Id. at 84. 
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Lehman of New York asked Rockefeller to commission a private 
study that compared methods of alcohol regulation.136 In late 1933, 
Rockefeller published the study, entitled Toward Liquor Control, 
which was popularly known as the Rockefeller Report.137 
Rockefeller’s report gave detailed proposals for two methods of 
liquor regulation: state-run monopolies and state licensing 
systems.138 New York’s state legislators adopted the state licensing 
system.139 By 1937, twenty-six States had implemented licensing 
systems, eighteen States had implemented monopolies, and the rest 
remained dry, that is, they continued to ban the sale of alcohol.140 
Almost every state that implemented a licensing system limited 
the retail, wholesale, and manufacturing licenses it issued to 
residents of the state or domestic corporations.141 Today, most 
States still use the three-tier system to regulate alcohol, and the 
system enjoys wide support as the preferred means of regulating 
the alcoholic beverages industry within the federal system.142 In 
                                                           
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 86–87; see also John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Foreword to TOWARD 
LIQUOR CONTROL, at viii (Raymond B. Fosdick & Albert L. Scott, eds., 
1933). 
138 See Levine, supra note 132, at 93. 
139 Id. at 89, 95; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. 
140 See Robert H. Skilton, State Power Under the Twenty-First 
Amendment, 7 BROOK. L. REV. 342, 345–46 & nn.18–19 (1937). 
141 Notes, Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage Laws-
Experience Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 
(1959); see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 518 n.6 (2005) (Thomas J., 
dissenting) (listing the residency, citizenship, or physical presence requirements 
of twenty States during the 1930s of Colorado (“residency”), Florida 
(“prohibiting out-of-state manufacturers from being distributors”), Illinois 
(“residency”), Indiana (“residency”), Maryland (“residency”), Massachusetts 
(“residency”), Michigan (“residency”), Missouri (“citizenship”), Nebraska 
(“residency” and “physical presence”), Nevada (“residency and physical 
presence”), New Jersey (“citizenship and residency”), North Carolina 
(“residency”), North Dakota (“citizenship and residency”), Ohio (“residency and 
physical presence”), Rhode Island (“residency”), South Dakota (“residency”), 
Vermont (“residency”), Washington (“physical presence” and “citizenship and 
residency”), Wisconsin (“citizenship and residency”), and Wyoming 
(“citizenship and residency”).). 
142 See State Shipping LawsThe Wine Institute, available at 
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limiting direct shipment to in-state wine retailers, then, New 
York’s three-tier system is consistent with the practices of the 
majority of states that permit some level of direct shipping.143 
Currently, of the thirty-five States that permit some level of direct 
shipping to in-state consumers, only fourteen permit out-of-state 
wine retailers to ship directly to consumers.144 
Although the three-tier system is long-standing, widely used, 
and “unquestionably legitimate,” this is not to say that the system 
is perfect or inviolate.145 As Granholm demonstrated, the system 
can and must be modified when it violates the dormant aspect of 
the Commerce Clause.146 In that case, out-of-state wineries 
challenged Michigan and New York shipping laws that allowed in-
state wineries to bypass wholesalers and retailers and ship directly 
to in-state consumers while denying that same opportunity to out-
of-state wine retailers.147 The Supreme Court rejected New York’s 
argument that out-of-state wineries were seeking “nothing less than 
the dismantling of New York’s 70-year-old three-tier distribution 
system.”148 The Granholm majority explained: 
The States argue that any decision invalidating their direct-
shipment laws would call into question the 
constitutionality of the three-tier system. This does not 
follow from our holding. . . . States may . . . assume direct 
control of liquor distribution through state-run outlets or 
funnel sales through the three-tier system. . . . State policies 
                                                           
http://www.wineinstitute.org/initiatives/stateshippinglaws (last visited Apr. 6, 
2008). 
143 See id. 
144 See Peck, supra note 2, at 22; see also Press Release, Specialty Wine 
Retailer’s Ass’n, New Wine Retailer Association Formed to Ensure Consumer 
Access to National Wine Market (Mar. 6, 2006), available at http://www. 
specialtywineretailers.org/forms/SWRA%20Intro%20Release%20FINAL.pdf. 
145 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488–89 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 
495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990)); see also North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 447 (Scalia J., 
concurring). 
146 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
147 See id. at 465–66. 
148 Brief for Respondents, Swedenburg v. Kelly, No. 03-1274, 2004 WL 
2138121, at *12–13 (U.S. Sept. 23, 2004). 
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are protected under the Twenty-first Amendment when 
they treat liquor produced out-of-state the same as its 
domestic equivalent. The instant cases, in contrast, involve 
straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of local 
producers. The discrimination is contrary to the Commerce 
Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first 
Amendment.149 
 As Granholm demonstrated, although the general three-tier 
system may be legitimate, certain portions are severable and can be 
struck down as unconstitutional without rendering the remainder of 
the regulatory scheme impractical or invalid.150 New York’s use of 
the ban on interstate direct shipping to provide its in-state retailers 
with exclusive access to New York’s lucrative consumer market151 
are not “an integral part of the three-tier system upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Granholm.”152 If New York ceased its 
discrimination against out-of-state wine retailers, it could still 
maintain centralized control over the regulation of alcohol “by 
requiring a permit as a condition of direct shipping.”153 The 
Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of “the constitutionality of the 
three-tier system” in no way supports the conclusion that any 
challenge to ABC Laws “must fail.”154 To the contrary, the 
Granholm majority at once upheld the constitutionality of the 
three-tier system and severed and struck down the unequal 
                                                           
149 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488–89 (2005). 
150 See Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 869 (N.D. Tex. 
2008) (“A decision . . . that invalidates components of a state’s direct-shipment 
laws does not necessarily call into question the constitutionality of the state’s 
three-tier system.”) (citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488); see also Siesta Vill. 
Mkt. v. Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 2984127, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 
12, 2007). 
151 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 100(1), 102(1)(a), 102(1)(b) 
(Gould 2007). 
152 Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 413–14 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
153 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491; see also Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 867 
(holding that the lack of proof that Texas would encounter difficulty collecting 
taxes in the context of alcohol sales is fatal). 
154 Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 411. 
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treatment of in-state and out-of-state shippers, establishing that 
state laws regulating the distribution of alcohol must be in harmony 
with the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause:155 
If a State chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must 
do so on evenhanded terms. Without demonstrating the 
need for discrimination, New York and Michigan have 
enacted regulations that disadvantage out-of-state wine 
producers. Under our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 
these regulations cannot stand.156 
 By choosing to allow the direct shipment of wine to in-state 
consumers, New York took on the added responsibility of treating 
in-state and out-of-state business interests equally. Although the 
Arnold’s Wines court may validly maintain that “[the Twenty-first 
Amendment] authorizes the States to require all sellers of alcoholic 
beverages to obtain permits and . . . nothing in Granholm alters this 
result,”157 it cannot use this line of reasoning to undermine the basic 
proposition in Granholm that New York, after allowing direct 
shipments of wine in general, cannot grant this right to some and 
deny it to others on the basis of state citizenship alone.158 
In upholding the constitutionality of the three-tier system in 
general in North Dakota v. United States, the Supreme Court did so 
without using a Commerce Clause analysis.159 The plurality 
opinion found that the challenged regulations were “within the core 
of the State’s power under the Twenty-first Amendment” because 
North Dakota’s legislature had enacted them “in the interest of 
promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and 
raising revenue.”160 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia 
observed that the Twenty-first Amendment “empowers North 
                                                           
155 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489–93 (2005). 
156 Id. at 493. 
157 Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 411; see also State Bd. of 
Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 60–62 (1936) 
(affirming that the Twenty-first Amendment authorizes a state licensing fee to 
wholesale importers even though it is a “direct burden on interstate commerce”). 
158 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493 (“If a State chooses to allow direct 
shipment of wine, it must do so on evenhanded terms.”). 
159 See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990). 
160 Id. at 432. 
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Dakota to require that all liquor sold for use in the State be 
purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler.”161 As observed in 
Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle,162 nine Supreme Court justices were 
in agreement that North Dakota’s three-tier system was 
“unquestionably legitimate.”163 A majority of the Court, however, 
declined to join Justice Scalia in arguing that the Twenty-first 
Amendment allowed North Dakota to require that all liquor sold 
for use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state 
wholesaler.164 This is not a matter of settled law, but what is clear 
is that New York’s use of a ban on interstate direct shipping is not 
so clearly, as asserted in Arnold’s Wines, “within the authority 
granted to New York by the Twenty-first Amendment.”165 
III.  STRIKING DOWN NEW YORK’S USE OF THE BAN DOES NOT 
ABROGATE NEW YORK’S TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Striking down New York’s use of the ban on interstate direct 
shipping laws to discriminate against out-of-state retailers would 
not be an abrogation of New York’s Twenty-first Amendment 
rights because the shipping laws exist within the limitations of a 
superseding federal framework in which the dormant aspect of the 
Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate 
commerce. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment states: “The 
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or 
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited.”166 The language of the amendment differs subtly but 
importantly from the language of the predecessor Webb-Kenyon 
Act, which prohibited the interstate shipment of liquor into a State 
“in violation of any law of such State,” with the phrase “any law” 
suggesting that “any law, including a ‘discriminatory’ one,” was 
                                                           
161 Id. at 447. 
162 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
163 Id. at 413 (citing North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432). 
164 Id. 
165 Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 414. 
166 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
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permissible.167 As the Court explained in Granholm, this notable 
change in language from “any laws” in the Webb-Kenyon Act to 
simply “laws” in the amendment reflects the basic proposition that 
the “Twenty-first Amendment does not supersede other 
provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, does not displace 
the rule that States may not give a discriminatory preference to 
their own producers.”168 
Although the court in Arnold’s Wines correctly observed that 
the Granholm majority “concluded that Section 2 [of the Twenty-
first Amendment] restored to the States the Commerce Clause 
immunity provided by the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts,”169 a 
review of these Acts and their reception by the Supreme Court 
demonstrates that these Acts did not immunize State regulation of 
alcohol from the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause.170 To 
the contrary, when the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts were 
passed into law, States were no more able to discriminate against 
out-of-State liquor providers then they were against in-state 
providers.171 Rather than empower States to treat in-state and out-
of-state competitors differently, these Acts standardized how a 
State regulated domestic and imported liquor, giving States the 
power to treat both equally.172 To the extent that the Twenty-first 
Amendment was modeled on the language of these predecessor 
Acts, and these Acts did not immunize states from the 
nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause, the Twenty-
first Amendment itself must be understood as existing within the 
ambit of the Commerce Clause.173 As contemporary commentators 
explained in the aftermath of the repeal of Prohibition: 
The adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment does not, as 
many people think, wipe the slate clean for completely new 
                                                           
167 Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d at 413 (quoting Granholm, 544 
U.S. at 500 (Thomas, J., dissenting)) (quoting 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2007)). 
168 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 486. 
169 Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 515 F. Supp. 2d 401, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007). 





 DON’T PUT A CORK IN GRANHOLM V. HEALD 959 
systems of liquor control. It leaves untouched the laws and 
constitutional provisions now existing in the various states. 
Moreover, a number of federal statutes relating to liquor 
were passed before the adoption of the Eighteenth 
Amendment and have never been repealed. After a period of 
more or less suspended animation, these laws now revive 
and may become potent instruments of control.174 
A. Before Prohibition and the Passing of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, the Commerce Clause Prohibited States 
from Burdening Interstate Commerce Involving Alcohol 
The Twenty-first Amendment was drafted with the knowledge 
that preexisting laws and doctrines, like the Commerce Clause, 
would prevent states from using the Amendment to burden 
interstate commerce.175 It was commonly understood that the 
Amendment did not “wipe the slate clean.”176 In particular, prior 
Supreme Court cases interpreted two pre-Prohibition statutes—the 
Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act—that both influenced the 
drafting of Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.177 When the 
Supreme Court reviewed these cases in Granholm, two distinct 
principles emerged.178 First, the cases collectively held that the 
Commerce Clause prohibited state discrimination against imported 
liquor.179 Second, the cases as a group held that the dormant aspect 
of the Commerce Clause prohibited states from passing “facially 
neutral laws that placed an impermissible burden on interstate 
commerce.”180 These two distinct principles stand for the 
proposition that the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause 
prevents states from using the Twenty-first Amendment to burden 
                                                           
174 RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR 
CONTROL 20 (1933). 
175 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476. 
176 FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 174, at 20. 
177 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 477. 
180 Id. 
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interstate commerce.181 
In the earliest cases, before the Wilson Act was passed in 1890, 
the Supreme Court used the dormant aspect of the Commerce 
Clause to invalidate state liquor regulations.182 In Bowman v. 
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., for instance, the Supreme 
Court struck down an Iowa law that prohibited common carriers 
from transporting liquor into Iowa from another State unless it was 
certified beforehand that the recipient was authorized to sell the 
liquor.183 The Supreme Court explained that the Commerce Clause 
prohibits even nondiscriminatory regulations “directly affecting 
interstate commerce.”184 After Bowman, however, the question 
remained whether a State could ban the sale of imported liquor after 
it had arrived in the State.185 This issue was resolved two years 
later in Leisy v. Hardin, when the Supreme Court held that Iowa 
could not ban the sale of imported beer sold in “original packages,” 
and that, “in the absence of congressional permission to do so, the 
state had no power to interfere by seizure, or any other action, in 
prohibition of importation and sale by the foreign or non-resident 
importer.”186 Under Leisy, States could ban the sale of liquor made 
within the State but could not stop sales of imported liquor.187 
To remedy this unequal treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
liquor, Congress passed the Wilson Act in 1890, which gave States 
the power to regulate imported liquor “upon arrival in such State    
. . . to the same extent and in the same manner” as domestic 
liquor.188 Eight years later, however, the Supreme Court held that 
the Wilson Act did not authorize States to prohibit the importation 
of liquor for personal use.189 Although the Supreme Court 
                                                           
181 Id. at 476. 
182 Id. at 476–78. 
183 See 125 U.S. 465, 496–98 (1888). 
184 Id. at 497. 
185 See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 124–25 (1890). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 125; see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 478 (2005). 
188 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 478 (quoting Act of Aug. 8, 1890, ch. 728, 26 
Stat. 313 (codified as amended at 27 U.S.C. § 121)). 
189 See generally Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898); Vance v. W.A. 
Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438 (1898). 
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recognized that States could ban the sale of imported liquor in its 
“original package,” the Court interpreted the phrase “upon arrival” 
to mean that State law only controlled after delivery to the in-state 
recipient and not when the imported liquor entered into the 
State.190 The practical result of this decision was a thriving mail 
order liquor business because States could ban the sale of imported 
liquor within the State but not the importation of the liquor 
itself.191 In effect, the Rhodes decision created a “direct-shipment 
loophole.”192 
Congress closed this loophole with the Webb-Kenyon Act of 
1913.193 The Act solidified the States’ power to regulate the sale of 
alcohol and provided that: 
[T]he shipment . . . of any . . . intoxicating liquor of any 
kind from one State . . . into any other State . . . which . . . 
is intended . . . to be received, possessed, sold, or in any 
manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in 
violation of any law of such State .  .  . is prohibited.194 
Four years later, in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland 
Railway Co., the Supreme Court acknowledged that, with the 
passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act, States had the power to regulate 
the transportation of liquor, even though this additional regulatory 
power imposed a direct burden on interstate commerce.195 
However, as the Granholm majority observed, “The Wilson Act 
reaffirmed, and the Webb-Kenyon Act did not displace, the 
Court’s line of Commerce Clause cases striking down state laws 
that discriminated against liquor produced out of state. . . . States 
were required to regulate domestic and imported liquor on equal 
terms.”196 
As the Granholm majority further observed, “The wording of § 
                                                           
190 Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 420. 
191 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 480. 
192 Id. at 481. 
193 Id. 
194 Act of Mar. 1, 1913, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699, 699–700 (codified as 
amended at 27 U.S.C. § 122). 
195 See 242 U.S. 311, 320–23 (1917). 
196 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 483 (2005) (emphasis added). 
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2 of the Twenty-first Amendment closely follows the Webb-
Kenyon and Wilson Acts, expressing the framers’ clear intention of 
constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework established 
under those statutes.”197 In conclusion, the Granholm majority 
determined that: 
The aim of the Twenty-first Amendment was to allow 
States to maintain an effective and uniform system for 
controlling liquor by regulating its transportation, 
importation, and use. The Amendment did not give States 
the authority to pass nonuniform laws in order to 
discriminate against out-of-state goods, a privilege they had 
not enjoyed at any earlier time.198 
The Court found that “[s]tate policies are protected under the 
Twenty-first Amendment when they treat liquor produced out-of-
state the same as its domestic equivalent.”199 
B. The Commerce Clause has Come to Limit States from  
Using the Twenty-first Amendment to Burden Interstate 
Commerce 
Even though the Twenty-first Amendment grants States the 
power to regulate alcohol within their borders, the amendment does 
not prevent the application of the Commerce Clause to individual 
provisions that are clearly discriminatory in nature. 200 In rejoicing 
that “the power of a dry state to exclude liquor shipments, 
previously protected only by Act of Congress, will be given the 
added sanction of an express constitutional guarantee,” 
commentators at the time of the passing of the amendment give 
telling insight into the fact that the Twenty-first Amendment was 
commonly understood to have been designed to preserve a state’s 
right to ban completely the sale of alcoholic beverages, not to ban 
                                                           
197 Id. at 484 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205–06 (1976)). 
198 Id. at 484–85. 
199 Id. at 489. 
200 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 
U.S. 573, 584 (1986) (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275 
(1984)); see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487–88 (2005). 
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the sale of out-of-state beverages while allowing in-state sellers 
exclusive access to local markets.201 A series of Supreme Court 
cases following the enactment of the amendment illustrate how 
“the Twenty-first Amendment did not entirely remove state 
regulation of alcohol from the reach of the Commerce Clause.”202 
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, for instance, the Supreme 
Court struck down a Hawaii statute that exempted local producers 
from a state excise tax on liquor and rejected the State of Hawaii’s 
argument that the Twenty-first Amendment authorized the State to 
discriminate against out-of-state liquor products.203 Similarly, in 
Healy v. Beer Institute, the Supreme Court struck down “price 
affirmation” statutes that forced liquor producers to affirm that 
they were not charging lower prices for liquor in other states.204 In 
his concurrence to the opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that the 
statute’s “invalidity is fully established by its facial discrimination 
against interstate commerce,” and that this “discriminatory 
character eliminates the immunity afforded by the Twenty-first 
Amendment.”205 These decisions reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s 
basic proposition articulated in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage 
Liquor Corp. that “[l]ike other provisions of the Constitution,” the 
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment “each must be 
considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues 
and interests at stake in any concrete case.”206 
                                                           
201 FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 174, at 21. 
202 Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 277; Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 
324, 343 (1989); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 
324, 332 (1964); see also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487–88. 
203 See 468 U.S. at 274–76 (“The central purpose of the [Twenty-first 
Amendment] was not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by 
erecting barriers to competition.”). 
204 491 U.S. at 343. 
205 Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
206 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964). 
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C. The Granholm Majority Determined that Shipping Laws 
Favoring In-State Businesses Burden Interstate 
Commerce 
In reviewing Michigan and New York’s ban on interstate direct 
shipping that favored in-state wineries at the expense of out-of-
state competitors, the Granholm majority found that the statutes 
“involve[d] straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of 
local producers.”207 The Granholm majority held that “the 
Twenty-first Amendment does not immunize all [state liquor] laws 
from Commerce Clause challenge.”208 As the Texas Siesta Village 
Market plaintiffs observed, “Nowhere in the majority opinion in 
Granholm is there the slightest whiff of a suggestion that a 
discriminatory part of a three-tier system is legitimate.”209 As the 
Granholm majority explained: 
State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce 
face a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity. . . .’ The Michigan 
and New York laws by their own terms violate this 
proscription. The two States, however, contend their 
statutes are saved by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment   
. . . . The States’ position is inconsistent with our 
precedents and with the Twenty-first Amendment’s history. 
Section 2 does not allow States to regulate the direct 
shipment of wine on terms that discriminate.  .  .  .”210 
Within this framework, the Granholm Court concluded that the 
States’ direct shipment laws, allowing in-state, but not out-of-
state, wineries to ship directly to in-state customers, were not 
authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment.211 Where, as here, the 
aspect of New York’s ban on interstate direct shipping that 
discriminates in favor of in-state retailers comes as a direct result of 
New York’s choice to allow the direct shipment of wine, such 
                                                           
207 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005). 
208 Id. at 488. 
209 Letter Brief by Siesta Village Plaintiffs at 3, Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Perry, 
530 F. Supp. 2d 848 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (underline in the original). 
210 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476 (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
211 Id. at 493. 
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discrimination finds no protection in the Twenty-first Amendment 
under Granholm. Though New York has “virtually complete 
control” over in-state liquor distribution, “there is a marked 
difference between ‘virtually complete control’ and absolute 
control,” and New York cannot unduly burden interstate 
commerce.212 The Supreme Court has declared that it will strike 
down New York law that “‘directly regulates or discriminates 
against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state 
economic interests over out-of-state interests.’”213 By giving 
exclusive access to New York’s lucrative direct shipping wine 
market to its own in-state retailers, New York has protected its 
own business at the expense of interstate commerce. Nothing in the 
Twenty-first Amendment justifies such economic protectionism.214 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of direct shipping is a complex matter. The difficulty 
in weighing the federal interest in promoting free trade among the 
States against each individual State’s interests in regulating alcohol 
is reflected in the differing approaches taken by the New York, 
Michigan, and Texas courts when addressing whether a state may 
create an in-state direct shipping market and grant its in-state 
retailers exclusive access to that market by banning interstate direct 
shipments of wine.215 Even in the Texas Siesta Village Market 
decision, though it correctly balances the federal Commerce Clause 
interest in free trade against the States’ Twenty-first Amendment 
                                                           
212 Siesta Vill. Mkt. v. Granholm, No. 06-13041, 2007 WL 2984127, at 
*4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2007) (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Ass’n v. Midcal 
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interest in regulating alcohol, the court falters in determining that, 
while bans on direct interstate shipping are unconstitutional, the 
Texas Code requirement that out-of-state retailers can only sell 
wine to Texans that had been purchased from Texas wholesalers 
withstands Commerce Clause analysis.216 This holding effectively 
allows the State of Texas to continue discriminating against out-of-
state retailers whose home states prohibit them from purchasing 
wine from wholesalers in other states, including Texas.217 
The underlying problem faced by both the New York and 
Texas courts is how to remove the provisions within the three-tier 
system that harm the federal interest in free trade without 
hamstringing the functionality of the three-tier system.218 The 
Texas court at least addressed this problem in good faith, 
recognizing that treating similarly situated businesses, e.g., in-state 
and out-of-state retailers, differently based solely on their location 
amounts to base economic protectionism.219 The New York 
Arnold’s Wines decision, however, failing as it does to fully 
appreciate the federal interest in free trade and in its eagerness to 
accept the ban on direct shipping as necessary for upholding the 
State interest in maintaining its three-tier system—without a 
showing that the three-tier system would fail without the ban on 
direct shipping—departs from the nuanced and measured approach 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Granholm.220 
The Granholm majority sought to broadly protect out-of-state 
“economic interests” as well as producers from discriminatory 
state practices221 and demonstrated that aspects of the three-tier 
                                                           
216 See Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 869–70. 
217 See id. at 870–71. 
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system can and must be modified when they burden free trade 
between the States.222 By allowing in-state but not out-of-state 
wine retailers to ship directly to in-state customers, New York 
discriminates against interstate commerce when a reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternative is available and preferable to 
restricting in-state retailersallowing out-of-state retailers to 
apply and qualify for direct shipping permits.223 Modifying New 
York’s use of its ban on interstate shipping does not abrogate New 
York’s Twenty-first Amendment power to regulate alcohol 
because that power exists within a federal framework in which 
state laws regulating alcohol cannot discriminate against out-of-
state businesses with impunity and burden interstate commerce.224 
For these reasons, the Arnold’s Wines decision should be 
reversed. New York should not be able to treat in-state and out-of-
state wine retailers differently solely on the basis of their residence. 
Such discrimination violates the federal interest in promoting free 
trade among the States, and while New York may try to put a cork 
in Granholm v. Heald, there is still plenty left in the bottle. 
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